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ABSTRACT 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, were a wakeup call for the United States.  In the 
aftermath, the U.S. government created the Department of Homeland Security to 
coordinate the efforts of securing the nation’s porous borders.  One of the many tools 
developed to secure the nation was the development of a network of state and local fusion 
centers throughout the country.  This thesis examines the effectiveness of fusion centers 
as a network of information collaboration to counter illegal activity by involving rural 
residents and local law enforcement as force multipliers in sparsely populated border 
states.  This study incorporates case studies from the states of North Dakota and 
Washington, as both are northern tier states whose geographical diversities and 
challenges are representative of problems facing any northern border state.  The results of 
this study suggest that fusion centers, while still in their infancy, are an effective tool to 
enhance information flow and provide leadership the ability to centralize efforts to 
leverage resources to counter both natural and manmade events. 
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I. FUSION CENTERS: SECURING AMERICA’S HEARTLAND 
FROM THREATS 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, were a wakeup call for the United 
States.1  In the aftermath, the U.S. government created the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to take control over 22 federal agencies,2 and today the number of federal 
agencies within DHS has grown to 27.3  Since DHS’s inception, it has spent over 
$360 billion.4  One of the main priorities for the U.S. government was to secure the 
nation’s northern, southern, and coastal borders against all external threats, to include 
international terrorists, drugs, foreign disease, and other dangerous intrusions.5  It is not 
possible, however, to fully secure large, open areas such as America’s border states from 
all forms of terrorism.6   
One of the many tools developed to keep the country secure is the development of 
a network of state and local fusion centers throughout the country.  This thesis will 
examine the effectiveness of Fusion Centers as a network of information collaboration 
centers to counter illegal activity by involving rural residents and local law enforcement 
as force multipliers in sparsely populated border states to more successfully counter and 
respond to extremist activity.  
                                                 
1 President George W. Bush, “Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation,” (Washington, DC: 
The White House, 2002), 2. 
2 DHS Budget In Brief, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “FY2005.” 
3 DHS Organizational Chart, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Organizational Chart.” 
4 DHS Budget In Briefs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “FY 2004–2011.” 
5 Bush, “Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation,” 16.  
6 Michael O’Hanlon and Jeremy Shapiro, “Introduction,” Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007, ed. 
Michael d’Arcy, Michael O’Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg (Washington, 
D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 6.  
 2
B. IMPORTANCE 
Looking at the southern and northern borders of the United States, there have 
been two different approaches due to the unique characteristics of each.  Historically, the 
focus on the 1,900-mile U.S. southern border has been on security issues related to 
significantly higher drug trafficking and illegal immigration.7  The emphasis has recently 
been to guard against the spillover of violent crime into the United States from the 
Mexican government’s crackdown on drug cartels.8  The focus on the nearly 4,000-mile 
northern U.S. border has traditionally been with illegal smuggling of drugs and weapons; 
however, DHS reports indicate that the terrorist threat actually is higher on the northern 
border, due to the large expanse of area with limited law enforcement coverage.9  This 
seam, or gap in attention—the focus is primarily on the southern border while northern 
border security has been often overlooked10—suggests a terrorist could navigate through 
the woods, farmlands, rivers, and lakes in the northern-tier boundaries and present a 
significant threat to national security.11  
North Dakota is the nineteenth-largest state in terms of land area,12 it shares a 
common 310-mile border with Canada, and it is one of the least populous states in the 
nation.13 It thus falls directly into the criteria identified by DHS as a state where the 
terrorist threat may be high.  With 18 border crossings (only three open 24 hours),14 there 
                                                 
7 Government Accountability Office, Report Northern Border Security: DHS’s Report Could Better 
Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities, 
GAO Report GAO-09-93 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2008), 1. 
8 Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, testimony before Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. 
9 Government Accountability Office, Report Northern Border Security: DHS’s Report Could Better 
Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities, 
GAO Report GAO-09-93 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2008), 5. 
10 Ike Skelton, Representative (MO), Comments from “U.S. Northern Border Security— National 
Security Implications and Issues for the Armed Services Hearing,” U.S. Government Printing Office 
(Washington, D.C.: 2007), 3. 
11 John Conyers, Jr., Representative (MI), comments from “U.S. Northern Border Security— National 
Security Implications and Issues for the Armed Services Hearing,” U.S. Government Printing Office 
(Washington: 2007), 7. 
12 U.S. Census Bureau, “Quick Facts.” 
13 Encyclopedia Britannica, “North Dakota.”  
14 State of North Dakota, “North Dakota Department of Transportation Tourism Map.” 
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are a lot of open areas for illegal crossings for illicit purposes.  This thesis will propose 
that the most effective way for this sparsely populated area of the nation’s border to work 
to counter terrorist and other illegal activity is through the use of international, federal, 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement coordination along with the most important 
aspect—the involvement of local citizens through the use of Fusion Centers.   
The use of this collaborative network nationally will also be critical to help 
identify the ever-rising threat of “homegrown” terrorists.  There is more than just one 
type of terrorist organizations, and America has been struck severely before by one of 
these other groups.  The second-deadliest terrorist attack after 9/11 in the United States—
the 1965 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which 
killed 169 people—was carried out by Timothy McVeigh, who had received backing 
from a Christian militant group.15 Empowering the resources of all law enforcement 
agencies and informing America’s citizens, similar to what was done during the 
millennium threat,16 will greatly enhance the capability to detect and deter both 
transnational and homegrown extremists.   
This threat of homegrown violent extremism has recently been brought back to 
the forefront of national attention due to the highly publicized cases of “Jihad Jane” in 
March 2010,17 the Fort Hood, Texas, attacks late last year,18 and the failed bombing of 
Times Square in May 2010.19  These cases illustrate the threat from within the United 
States, as in the past two years more than a dozen people with U.S. citizenship or 
residency have been accused of supporting, attempting, or carrying out attacks on U.S. 
soil.20 
                                                 
15 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. (New 
York: Springer, 2006), 239. 
16 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), 358–359.  
17 “Jihad Jane, “American who lived on Main Street,” CNN, 10 March 2010. 
18 Martha Raddatz, Brian Ross, Mary-Rose Abraham, and Rehab El-Buri, “Senior Official: More 
Hasan Ties to People Under Investigation by FBI,” ABC News, 10 November 2009. 
19 “Times Square suspect charged in terror plot,” MSNBC, 4 May 2010. 
20 Ibid. 
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One of the main failures identified in the 9/11 Commission Report was the 
inability of the government’s intelligence agencies ability to work together to “connect 
the dots,”21 which resulted in several missed opportunities.22  To facilitate intelligence 
sharing and law enforcement coordination throughout the nation, the development and 
integration of State Fusion Centers was formalized by the signing of the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.23 
DHS has proposed a multilayered approach of border security, comprised of a 
balance of tactical infrastructure, technology, and personnel at our borders.24  Much of 
this can be found in the language of the Secure Fence Act of 2006.  For the northern 
border, this legislation directed DHS to conduct a study to encompass the northern 
border’s feasibility to be secured by a state of-the-art infrastructure security system.25  
The results of the DHS February 2008 study were critically reviewed by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) in November 2008, which stated that DHS was not fully 
responsive to the legislative requirements to provide information for improving northern 
border security.26 
One of the proposed technologies that is being pursued is the Secure Border 
Initiative network (SBInet), through which DHS is procuring and deploying a virtual 
fence along the borders comprised of detection equipment, sensors, cameras, and other 
high-tech tools.27  Currently, the focus for this network is on the southwest border and 
parts of the northern border.28   A specific stretch of the southern border has recently 
                                                 
21 “Establishing State Intelligence Fusion Centers,” NGA Center for Best Practices, 1. 
22 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 112–113. 
23 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers Concept 
of Operations,” 3–5.   
24 Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, testimony before Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 2–3. 
25 Secure Fence Act of 2006, Public Law 109-367-October 26, 2006, Sec 4. 
26 Government Accountability Office, Report Northern Border Security: DHS’s Report Could Better 
Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities, 
GAO Report GAO-09-93 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2008), 3–5. 
27 “Factsheet,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security Press Release.  
28 U.S. Customs and Border Protection. “SBInet Program, Program-Specific Recovery Act Plan” May 
15, 2009, 4. 
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received criticism from congressional oversight for costing “$770 million after four years 
and we are still waiting for the testing of a 23-mile stretch in the Tucson sector.”29  DHS 
has estimated the cost of this program to secure a majority of only the southern border is 
$6.7 billion.30  In contrast, the creation of 72 Fusion Centers in 50 states has cost the 
DHS $254 million.31   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
A majority of the efforts regarding homeland security have focused on preventing 
the last attack.32  In the pre-9/11 era immigration, visa, customs, and border security 
lapses enabled terrorists (1993 World Trade Center attack, the Millennium Plot, and the 
2001 perpetrators) to gain entry and to threaten and attack the U.S. homeland.33  With the 
emphasis on strengthening our nation’s Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE), 
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and tracking of transnational extremists through a 
variety of intelligence methods, the primary focus appears to be the use of a top-down, 
technology-led approach to secure our nation’s borders.    
Technology is generally an enabler that allows people to do things, whereas 
security is the opposite, as it tries to prevent people from doing things.34  An over-
reliance on technology can often lead to poor security, or even the opposite of security.35  
These technological advances to deter the last attack do little to anticipate new and 
innovative means for terrorists to plan new attacks, as policymakers often focus on 
preventing another 9/11 and fail to realize the threat has morphed.36  Radical terrorism 
                                                 
29 Senator Joseph Lieberman, Opening Statement from the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee Border Security: Moving Beyond the Virtual Fence, April 20 2010. 
30 “Work to cease on 'virtual fence' along U.S.-Mexico border,” The Washington Post, March 16, 
2010. 
31 “DHS Fusion Center Fact Sheet.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
32 Michael O’Hanlon and Jeremy Shapiro, “Introduction,” Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007, 4. 
33 Darwina S. Bugarin, “Training, Sevis, and NSEERS: Will They Stop Terrorists From Entering the 
U.S.?” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, (March 2007), 13. 
34 Schneier, Beyond Fear, 13. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Daniel Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (New Jersey: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc.), 132. 
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has altered its methods and has adopted new and innovative tactics and operational shifts 
while increasing the recruitment of U.S. and European nationals to evade detection.37   
With the use of rural residents38 and local law enforcement as a force multiplier39 in 
northern-tier states, such as North Dakota, enforcement will facilitate in shoring up the 
gaps for the nation’s porous borders.40   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature on the use of rural residents in the war on terrorism is generally 
unavailable, fragmented and uncoordinated.41  William Eller provides a detailed analysis 
for the use of rural American citizens in his thesis, “Leveraging Rural America in the 
Fight Against Terrorism,” which focuses on Washington State.  The author argues 
convincingly that these resources are an untapped capability that will be needed in these 
sparsely populated areas where terrorist organizations can and do plan, prepare, and 
execute attacks.42  Establishing an information-collective system in rural America will 
leverage rural America as a force multiplier in the war on terror.43   
David MacGregor’s study, “Fusion 2.0: The Next Generation of Fusion Centers in 
California: Aligning State and Regional Fusion Centers,” provides recommendations for 
collaboration at the state and regional centers to better align them.44 He compares 
California’s multiple State and Local Fusion Centers (SLFCs) with other states that had 
                                                 
37 Angel Rabasa et al., Beyond al-Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement. RAND, Project Air Force 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, 2006, xviii–xix. 
38 Brian Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy Strengthening Ourselves (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2006), 156.  
39 Michael O’Hanlon, “Roles of DoD and First Responders,” in Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007, 
ed. Michael d’Arcy, Michael O’Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 122. 
40 Michael O’Hanlon, “Border Protection,” in Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007, ed. Michael 
d’Arcy, Michael O’Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 101. 
41 William L. Eller, “Leveraging Rural America in the Fight Against Terrorism In America Through 
the Use of Conservation Districts,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, 6–8, 11. 
42 Ibid., 2. 
43 Ibid., 89. 
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multiple SLFCs, and the Joint Intelligence Centers in the United Kingdom and 
Germany.45  The key, he argues, is not only to create collaboration through interpersonal 
relationships, but to ensure their sustainability, which could be challenged if one of the 
commanders of these SLFCs should leave his/her assignment.46  
Gregory Brunelle provides insight on New York State’s robust information 
sharing environment and highly functioning state-level fusion centers in “Achieving 
Shared Situational Awareness During Steady-State Operations in New York State: A 
Model For Success.”47  He provides recommendations to synergize New York’s effort to 
manage all phases of emergency management.48 
Additionally, research has been conducted concerning New Hampshire’s 
Information and Analysis Center and how it can protect citizens’ rights while achieving 
the mission of the center.49  The author states that the difficulties of coordinating multiple 
state and federal agencies’ laws and regulations compounds efforts to have a single place 
to go to develop a privacy policy that takes into account all risks and vulnerabilities.50   
Since the formal inception of SLFCs, resulting from the signing of the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,51 much has been 
written both for supporting the operations of and cautioning against the potential 
violations of American citizen’s civil liberties from these centers.  The American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) has asked questions about who runs and is responsible for these 
organizations, the physical location and layout of these centers, the purpose for, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
44 David S. MacGregor, “Fusion 2.0: The Next Generation of Fusion in California: Aligning State and 
Regional Fusion Centers,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, 141–143.  
45 David S. MacGregor, “Fusion 2.0: The Next Generation of Fusion in California: Aligning State and 
Regional Fusion Centers,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, 11, 141–143. 
46 Ibid., 143. 
47 Gregory T. Brunnelle, “Achieving Shared Situational Awareness During Steady-State Operations in 
New York State: A Model For Success,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School 2010, 1. 
48 Ibid., 87–88. 
49 Jennifer L. Harper, “Fusion Center Privacy Policies: Does One Size Fit All?,” Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, 6. 
50 Ibid., 68–70. 
51 DHS, “Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers Concept of Operations,” 3–5. 
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personnel staffing52 and private sector participation in these organizations.53  The 
ACLU’s primary concerns regarding potential citizen’s civil rights issues from SFLCs 
are the ambiguous lines of authority, private sector and military participation, data 
fusion/data mining, and excessive secrecy.54  This thesis will argue that, with proper 
oversight, the concerns regarding civil liberty violations can be minimized while gaining 
the benefit of better securing our nation. 
Another study by NPS students describes fusion cells as being in their infancy.55   
The authors examined the characteristics that enable three types of fusion cells—
Department of Defense-led, State and Local Fusion Centers, and Department of 
Justice/Other Government Agency-led fusion cells.  They describe fusion cells as hubs in 
an interagency network which, if properly resourced, manned, and utilized, could tie 
together the best insights and capabilities of national level organizations in using a 
network to fight a network.56  This provides the best example in today’s fight against 
extremist terrorism of how to effectively conduct the counter-network warfare that is 
required to defeat today’s enemies.57 
It is, however, well understood that we cannot protect everything and everybody 
all the time.58  The use of technology is important, but the use of a bottom-up approach in 
conjunction with the current technical and organizational infrastructure is critical to 
augment resources in securing our nations northern border.  A step in the right direction 
to exponentially assist in this effort has been the creation of 72 Fusion Centers59 to 
include North Dakota.60  The use of local law enforcement structure will prove to be a 
                                                 
52 Todd Masse and John Rollins. A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for 
Congress, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service Report RL34177, 2007), 7–12. 
53 What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 2007, 11–17. 
54 Ibid., 3–4. 
55 Christopher Fussell, Trevor Hough, and Matthew Pedersen, “What Makes Fusion Cells Effective?” 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, 73. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Michael O’Hanlon and Jeremy Shapiro, “Introduction,” Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007, 6–7. 
59 “DHS Fusion Center Fact Sheet,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
60 “North Dakota Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Center,” State of North Dakota. 
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force multiplier and the awareness and involvement from the local citizens will enhance 
this capability.  This thesis will examine two specific states, North Dakota and 
Washington, to provide for the variation of physical, geographical and disparate 
population densities that are prevalent throughout the northern border.  Current literature 
does not provide much information regarding Fusion Center operations in North Dakota, 
while on the other hand there is substantial research available for Washington State. 
This bottom-up approach, building on local law enforcement and local citizen 
involvement will also prove to be essential for the best opportunity to detect, identify, and 
respond to extremist who currently reside within the United States and are U.S. citizens 
or legal residents.  In addition, as many of these centers have evolved into an all-hazards 
approach, it provides a centralized information sharing center that is quickly able to 
leverage local, state and federal resources to both natural and manmade events.  
Technology is important, but the use of local citizens for human intelligence (confidential 
informant) is the dominant collection discipline at the state level.61   
With the stagnating pace of implementing new and unproven technology, 
securing the northern border in the sparsely populated areas of North Dakota will be more 
effectively accomplished by focusing more on sharing intelligence between international 
partners, all levels of law enforcement agencies, and private citizens.62  In those large, 
vastly unpopulated regions of state where people reside and work there will notice when 
something seems out of the ordinary, and when afforded the information and 
understanding of knowing what to look for, to report these instances to their respective 
regional authorities.  They will provide the eyes and ears in these areas where and when 
law enforcement is not readily available.  Additionally, they will most likely be the first 
on scene when something does occur, as with the Times Square failed car bomb, found 
and reported by a local street vendor.63 
                                                 
61 James E. Steiner, “Improving Homeland Security at the State Level; Needed: State-level, Integrated 
Intelligence Enterprises,” in Studies in Intelligence: Journal of the Intelligence Professional, vol. 53, no. 3 
(September 2009). 
62 Henry A. Crumpton, “Intelligence and Homeland Defense” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, 
edited by Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 213–
214. 
63 “Times Square hero breaks silence,” MSNBC, 3 May 2010. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES AND THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis will be based on a combination of primary sources, government 
studies and secondary sources.  It will utilize process tracing, deductive analysis and the 
comparative study method, and will focus on two separate aspects of homeland security.  
The first is shoring up the northern border through the use of a bottom-up approach of 
local law enforcement and residents in sparsely populated areas through the use of 
SLFCs.  This thesis will examine the question of how to best protect the country’s 
borders by a comparative analysis of the Fusion Centers in the states of Washington and 
North Dakota.   
Second, the use of these Centers to collaborate information nationally will also 
possibly provide a critical part in the increased likelihood of identifying not only 
transnational extremists living and planning within our borders, but also the more likely 
identification for the increased threat of “homegrown” terrorists through the use of shared 
intelligence and response.  Additionally, the synergistic efforts of these Centers and 
agencies represented there will also prove invaluable when responding to a catastrophic 
event, manmade or natural, by effectively coordinating the response and allocating 
necessary resources to counteract the event. 
A comparative analysis will be utilized to evaluate the states of Washington and 
North Dakota, as they are both located in the northern tier and have a sparse population 
density along their shared borders with Canada.  Although there are differences 
(Washington State also has maritime boundaries), the purpose is to solidify the benefits 
and efficiencies gained from using a bottom-up approach by utilizing the largely 
untapped resource (local citizens) in providing information to their respective states’ 
Fusion Centers to aid in securing these borders.   
Through process tracing, this thesis will examine how Fusion Centers were 
established and how their roles and responsibilities were clarified to address lingering 




enforcement technological, organizational, and personnel infrastructures will enhance the 
capability of sharing critical information and leveraging appropriate assets to counter 
threats.   
After this introductory chapter, Chapter II will examine the history and 
background of fusion centers.  Chapter III will analyze what has been done to shore up 
the border in North Dakota through technology, coordination, and the interactive 
collaboration of the SLFCs in processing and sharing.  This analysis will then be applied 
to Washington State in Chapter IV.   The concluding chapter will demonstrate how the 
interactive collaboration of these centers in processing and sharing information will 
enhance the capabilities for the nation as a whole to work as a network to deter, detect, 
and respond to extremists threats.  These threats are both transnational terrorists who live 
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF FUSION CENTERS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the previous chapter, the costs to secure the nation through 
technology far outweigh the costs of State and Local Fusion Centers (SLFCs).  Again, 
technology is generally considered an enabler that allows people to do things, compared 
with security, which is the opposite as it tries to prevent people from doing things.64  An 
over-reliance on technology can often lead to poor security, or even the opposite of 
security.65  These technological advances to deter the last attack do little to anticipate the 
new and innovative means terrorists use to plan new attacks, as policymakers often focus 
on preventing another 9/11 and fail to realize the threat has morphed.66  To leverage any 
technological advancement in any meaningful manner will require actionable 
information, and this information will most likely reside with and be initiated by local 
citizens.  When provided this information, the state and local officials work through the 
SLFCs who are more able to properly analyze it with state and federal resources which 
can “connect the dots” and leverage proper agencies and resources to deter extremist 
activity.   
Radical terrorism has altered its methods and has adopted new and innovative 
tactics and operational shifts while increasing the recruitment of U.S. and European 
nationals to evade detection.67  Complicating this alteration of terrorist tactics is the 
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areas, such as America’s border states and sparsely populated rural regions, from all 
forms of terrorism or extremist activity.68  According to statements made by DHS 
Secretary Napolitano: 
The way to secure our country from this type of terrorism is the same way 
we must secure it from terrorism in general. This is a shared responsibility 
in which all Americans have a role to play. The federal government; law 
enforcement on the state, local, and tribal levels; and the American people 
are the lines of defense against terrorism, whether foreign-affiliated or 
homegrown. They complement each other, and they must work 
together…As a critical part of our efforts, DHS is reinvigorating its 
coordination and collaboration with our state, local, and tribal partners—
the Nation’s first preventers and first responders. The work of state, local, 
and tribal law enforcement at the local level puts them in the best position 
to notice when something is out of place and warrants a closer look—
which is often the first step to thwarting a domestic terrorism plot.. DHS is 
also strengthening the Department’s intelligence enterprise by supporting 
the state and major urban area fusion centers where state, local, tribal, and 
federal law enforcement and other emergency response providers share 
information and intelligence.69 
It would appear one of the more effective ways to defend against terrorist threats 
is through the use of Fusion Centers as an information collaboration network to counter 
illegal activity.  Utilizing local residents70 and law enforcement as force multipliers71 in 
enforcement will facilitate in shoring up the gaps for the nation’s porous borders.72   
B. FUSION CENTERS 
Fusion centers have been defined as the “collaborative effort of two or more 
Federal, state, local or tribal government agencies that combine resources, expertise, or 
information with the goal of maximizing the ability of these agencies to detect, deter, 
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investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal activity.”73  Sharing terrorist-related 
intelligence between law enforcement and security officials at all levels of government is 
important, because any terrorist attack in the homeland will necessarily occur within the 
state or tribal area, and the initial response will be by local responders. The plotting and 
preparation for a terrorist attack will also occur within these communities, and the 
information acquired for one purpose or under one set of authorities may provide insights 
when combined with seemingly unrelated information from other sources.74  If, or more 
likely when, a terrorist attack occurs on U.S. soil, the planning will occur here and the 
first on scene will be local first responders.75   
With the stagnating pace of implementing new and unproven technology, 
securing the homeland will be more effectively accomplished by focusing more on 
sharing intelligence between international partners, all levels of law enforcement 
agencies, and private citizens76 through the use of SLFCs.   In these areas, the people 
who live and work there will notice when something seems out of the ordinary or 
unusual, and with knowledge of knowing what to look for they will be more likely to 
report these occurrences to their respective authorities.  They will provide the eyes and 
ears in areas where and when law enforcement is not readily available. 
C. SLFC DEVELOPMENT BACKGROUND  
In the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the 9/11 Commission Report identified 
multiple lost opportunities to derail the attacks. Most of those opportunities revolved 
around the lack or inability to properly share information.77  To rectify many of the issues 
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relating to the failure of the government to “connect the dots” relating to intelligence 
collection and analysis from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress passed 
the Intelligence and Reform and Terrorism Protection Act (IRTPA) in 2004, which 
mandated the creation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE).  The intent for the 
ISE was to be a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment with appropriate 
protection of legal standards regarding civil liberties and privacy.78   
The creation of SLFCs was largely the result of pressure from the state and local 
governments to help improve information sharing and prevent terrorism and other 
threats.79  This effort was enhanced by as a result of the signing of the 9/11 Commission 
Act which directs DHS to establish a State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center 
Initiative.80  These actions were in response to the terrorist threat, as the American people 
and way of life being the primary target for terrorists.  Leveraging state and local law 
enforcement agencies against this threat was needed, as they have an important role to 
play in homeland defense and security.81 
This act facilitated the needed involvement of state and local officials, as the 
SLFC organizations would fall under the respective local authority (e.g., governor, 
mayor, police chief).  Frustrations with the pre-9/11 information-sharing environment 
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and other 
federal agencies also helped fuel the development of SLFCs.82 
Starting in 2004, federal funding for initial startup of SLFCs from DHS and 
continued through grants from DHS and other federal programs which has facilitated the 
growth of these organizations.  The state and local governments are responsible to 
identify centralized locations and to provide for ongoing, long-term funding for running 
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these centers.83  To date, as mentioned earlier, there are currently 72 SLFCs spread 
among each of the 50 states, the establishment of which has cost the DHS $254 million.84   
See Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.   State and Local Fusion Centers85 
D. FUSION CENTER EFFECTIVENESS AND SECURITY OF SOURCES 
AND METHODS  
Since terrorism is a complex multidimensional phenomenon, effective responses 
to this threat may need to take into consideration the evolving goals, strategies, tactics 
and operating environment of different terrorist groups.86  A common pitfall for 
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governments that seek success through quantitative indicators (i.e., money spent on anti-
terror measures) is that such measures do not necessarily take into account the terrorists’ 
evolving characteristics.87  However, for the purposes of this paper, effectiveness will be 
measured against the number of successful and/or planned attacks.   
There has not been a successful attack by a terrorist group within the United 
States since Sept 11, 2001.  However the number of global terrorist attacks has risen from 
348 in 2001 to 14,499 attacks in 2007.88  Although in the United States there have not 
been any “successful” attacks, there have been several jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by 
American citizens or lawful permanent residents of the United States.  From May 2009 to 
March 2010, there were 12; by comparison, during the seven years since the 9/11 attacks 
through May 2009 there was an annual average of two such plots, of which none resulted 
in attacks.89 
Where Fusion Centers’ effectiveness is gained is through the ability to cross 
multi-agency lines and produce a true interagency effort.  Critical to this is the ability to 
share actionable information.   
Strong information sharing is essential to law enforcement’s ability to 
assess data and analyze threats. As the primary information-sharing entity 
within the Department, DHS’ Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is 
taking the lead in meeting this need. I&A is currently undergoing an 
important realignment to strengthen to delivery of useful, actionable 
intelligence to state and local law enforcement, based on their particular 
needs. This focus on information sharing with our state, local and tribal 
partners has elevated the Department’s role at the Nation’s 72 state and 
major urban area fusion centers. These centers, established by state and 
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intelligence and analysis with our homeland security partners and are key 
tools for stakeholders at all levels of government to share information 
related to threats.90 
The ability of these centers to provide an avenue to bridge the gap between the 
intelligence community (IC) and state, local and tribal authorities is crucial to ensuring 
actionable information flow to protect America’s local communities.91  The collection of 
raw information hinges on the local citizens, who have a high degree of physical and 
social interconnectivity within their home areas.92  In passing this information through 
local authorities to the SLFCs, this raw information can be analyzed with the appropriate 
government intelligence agencies to produce actionable intelligence for local authorities 
to act upon.   This point is further emphasized in a recently released report from the 
Institute of Homeland Security Solutions where they identified since 1999, out of sixty 
eight foiled terrorist plots; thirty five were initiated by local law enforcement and public 
reporting.93 
Terrorism’s complex webs of characteristics, along with its inherent secrecy and 
compartmentalization of both terrorist organizations and government responses, limits 
available data94 that meets the classification level of this paper.  Historically, however, 
when dealing with information from federal agencies, one of the barriers to information 
sharing with the state, local, and tribal officials has been the need to protect the sources 
and methods used to obtain the intelligence information.95   
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In the context of Fusion Centers and where raw information comes from (local 
citizens), this could also be incorporated into the analyzing of the raw information by 
federal agencies/representatives within these cells into intelligence.  To aid in alleviating 
the classification and “need to know” issue, the federal government is providing a portion 
of the state and local representatives with appropriate security clearances to allow access 
to previously restricted intelligence96 to facilitate the actionable information aspect 
sought in these cells collaboration effort.   
With these SLFCs having the means and ability to obtain raw information, 
analyze it, and in turn be able to respond appropriately to intelligence provided through 
these SLFCs, the local authorities will be able to better respond to potential local threats 
with the input of actionable intelligence.  This is where the interagency collaboration is 
maximized and the intended purpose of the Fusion Center—to facilitate the information-
sharing environment.  
E. POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH SLFCS 
Since the development of SLFCs in the post 9/11 era, several criticisms have been 
raised regarding these organizations.  Many of these issues have centered on potential 
violations of American’s civil liberties, standardization and operational structure for each 
SLFC, the use of military in these centers in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, and 
private sector participation within SLFCs. 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has addressed potential violations of 
civil liberties by the creation and use of SLFCs.  They note the “dark history” of U.S. law 
enforcement, in which use of secret intelligence powers have created an invitation to 
abuse in the past.97  This abuse had occurred in the 20th century during the Counter 
Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) era, and involved the availability of law 
enforcement’s easy access to information, which resulted from the unrestrained collection 
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of domestic intelligence.  This collection originally grew from a legitimate effort to 
protect national security into an effort to suppress political dissent on activities of 
individuals or groups/organizations.98   
These concerns with information sharing and data collection from SLFCs have 
been further criticized with the lack of a standardized organizational structure, lines of 
authority and rules for information sharing.  These issues can lead to potential “data 
warehouse shopping” for data collection and sharing as the laws have not been specified 
to regulate what to share with law enforcement and non-law enforcement participants.99 
This point was also addressed by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
which recommended the creation of a National Fusion Center Strategy to provide these 
organizations legal guidelines in the protection of civil liberties.100  As a result, the U.S. 
government has produced several guiding documents, to include “Fusion Center 
Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era” in 2006, 
the “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers” and the “DHS 
Interaction with State and Local Fusion Center Concept of Operations” in 2008.  Central 
to these documents and the government’s interaction with SLFCs is the need to: 
Ensure that information shared fulfills Constitutional, statutory, 
regulatory, and other legal and policy requirements, as appropriate, 
including applicable Privacy and Civil Liberties standards.  These include, 
but are not limited to, the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution; the Privacy Act of 1974; 28 Code of Federal Regulations 
Part 23; Executive Order 12333; directives issued by the President, DHS, 
the Department of Justice, and the Intelligence Community; and other 
guidance provided by the Program Manger Information Sharing 
Environment; the National Strategy for Information Sharing.101  
Clearly, the issue of privacy and civil liberties for information collection and 
sharing will continue to be evaluated as this balance of security and civil liberties will be 
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driven by the country’s collective sense of security and safety.102  However, all state or 
local governments are required to maintain the federal standards of protection for 
constitutionally guaranteed civil rights or risk being in violation.  The first concern of any 
Fusion Center is to ensure the compliance with all federal laws and regulations regarding 
the protection of privacy and civil liberties.103  Through proper organizational and legal 
oversight, both federal and state/local levels will be able to adequately ensure the rights 
of citizens are maintained. 
Another issue, the lack of standardization of operations for these centers, has been 
addressed.  According to the CRS report for Congress, roughly 15% solely focus on 
counterterrorism, 40% focus on “all crimes”, and roughly 40% focus on “all-hazards.”104  
Of the 72 SLFCs recognized by DHS, each is designed differently, being able to respond 
to the unique requirements specific to the creation of that cell.105  In the case of the all-
hazards SLFCs, the ability to have a center to coordinate efforts in the event of a natural 
or manmade disaster to leverage local, state and federal resources and capabilities is 
essential. 
Having one “standard” for these centers is nearly impossible, as each individual 
location or state where these centers are located does not have identical concerns.  Since a 
majority of the funding and resources for the operations of these organizations resides 
with each respective jurisdiction, the operations of these centers must be tailored 
accordingly.106   
To amplify this point, the threats for SLFCs located at the southern and northern 
border have resulted in two different approaches due to the unique characteristics of each.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, historically the focus on the 1,900-mile U.S. 
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southern border has been on security issues related to significantly higher drug trafficking 
and illegal immigration.107  The emphasis has recently been to guard against the spillover 
of violent crime into the United States from the Mexican government’s crackdown on 
drug cartels.108  The focus on the nearly 4,000-mile northern U.S. border has traditionally 
been with illegal smuggling of drugs and weapons; however, DHS reports indicate that 
the terrorist threat is higher on this border due to the large expanse of area with limited 
law enforcement coverage.109   Suffice it to say that each locale must justify these centers 
to accommodate those threats and provide capabilities to deter and combat these threats 
to satisfy the constituents they represent. 
The concerns for the use of military and private sector participation in these 
centers have also been raised.  Many of the SLFCs have incorporated the use of National 
Guard members in these centers.  Since these personnel are assets of the State and the 
Governor, this is not a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of 1878.  However, in 
some SLFCs there are active-duty members who are a part of the SLFC, as in the case of 
the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center.110   
The rules and laws for use of federalized military members to be involved in 
domestic law enforcement are specific: most notably the PCA, the Insurrection Act (10 
United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 331-335), and the Robert T. Stafford Act for use by 
State Governors in requesting federal support during disasters (42 U.S.C. Sections 5121-
5206).  Under both the Insurrection Act111 and the Stafford Act,112 only when the state 
governor requests federal aid or resources from the president, will the use of federalized 
military members waive PCA limitations for direct involvement in law enforcement 
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activities by these forces.  Only in rare exceptions will the use of these federalized forces 
will be empowered without a governor’s request.  When the president considers unlawful 
rebellions or obstructions against the authority of the government of United States, the 
use militia and armed forces to enforce federal authority will be empowered without a 
state governor’s request.113   
In today’s environment, having resources at the ready is critical to ensure an 
adequate, timely response.  Having federalized military members in centers again refers 
back to the uniqueness of each Fusion Centers location.  Having them located there is not 
a legal violation; the problem arises with how they are utilized. 
Private sector participation within these centers is also addressed as an issue, as 
nearly 85% of the critical infrastructure is owned by private interests.114  The Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) partnership, as identified by the DHS, is 
essential to asses risk from scenarios as a function of consequence, vulnerability, and 
threat115 to identify and improve strategies to support national level through comparative 
risk assessment, investments, incident response planning and resource prioritization.116   
A majority of the nation’s critical infrastructure, including communications and 
electrical power supplies, is owned by private interests.  These privatized companies need 
to be involved to work through planning and coordination for potential responses to 
protect these respective assets.  However, the sharing of any information again falls back 
to the respective legal rules regarding constitutionally protected privacy and civil liberties 
identified earlier.    
F. USE OF A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH  
The use of local law enforcement in conjunction with local community members 
to provide for and secure their respective jurisdictions is critical to ensure the safety and 
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security of the nation as a whole.  The federal government, with limited personnel and 
resources, cannot do it all by itself.  State and local authorities employ roughly 
800,000117 to 1.1 million118 law enforcement officers, whereas the federal government 
employs roughly 25,000.119  The threat of attacks has changed from state-supported to 
non-state actors and this threat of radicalization and extremism has morphed even further.   
We are now seeing the threat change from a 9/11-type of attack with the use of 
multiple foreign hijackers to the increasing threat of homegrown extremist who currently 
reside and are U.S. citizens or legal residents.  In a period of less than one year (May 
2009-March 2010), there were twelve “homegrown” terrorist attacks or plots by citizens 
or lawful permanent residents of the United States120  This threat of potentially 
radicalized homegrown terrorists has recently been brought back to the forefront of 
national attention due to the highly publicized cases of “Jihad Jane” in March 2010,121 
the Fort Hood, Texas attacks122 and the failed bombing of Times Square in May 2010.123  
The importance of state and local law enforcement’s utilization for combating 
domestic terrorism is more than just resources or constitutional correctness.  It is because 
a majority of the state and local agencies rely upon one or more of the three policing 
techniques to secure their jurisdiction—community policing, intelligence led policing, 
and problem-oriented policing.124  Federal agents typically enter into a community 
during active investigations, whereas the state and local authorities live and work there.   
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The familiarity advantage that state and local officials gain of their jurisdictions 
and of the people who reside and work there, are the result of the community members 
trusting these local officials.  From this trust, they share information about what is going 
on and law enforcement personnel also develop an instinct that allows them to sense 
when something is not right.125 
This practice of a bottom-up approach by state and local officials to gather 
evidence in order to prosecute criminals differs from the federal top-down model.126  A 
clear and important example that demonstrates this aspect is a local law enforcement 
agency’s ability to work confidential informants.  The national level agencies have no 
comparable state analogue, as this form of collection is a dominant discipline at the state 
level.127   In today’s threat environment evolution, the most effective fusion cells brings 
together the right people from the right organizations that is able to close the 
bureaucratic-seems that have been exploited by the enemy networks.128  Creation of these 
fusion networks provides the nation a mechanism to combat extremist threats, as “it takes 
networks to fight networks.”129  
To take this bottom-up approach a step further is the needed involvement of the 
local citizenry in these jurisdictions.  Empowering the resources of all law enforcement 
agencies and informing and educating America’s citizens, similar to what was done 
during the millennium threat,130 will greatly enhance the capability to detect and deter 
both transnational and homegrown extremists.  As part of the information collection 
system, the use of local and rural citizens will act as a force multiplier,131 being the eyes 
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and ears where local, state, and federal authorities are not.  Crucial to the effectiveness of 
this system is the trust with the citizens of these jurisdictions as this trust was not created 
by a top-down structure but rather by a bottom-up, dispersed network of local, rural 
people providing services where needed.132 
G. CONCLUSION 
The perceived threats to the United States changed dramatically since the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001.  This attack opened the eyes of the United States to the 
reality and dangers of international terrorism and its impact.  The failures of the 
government’s ability to “connect the dots” from the intelligence leading up to the attacks 
has been well documented and many efforts have been made in an attempt to rectify these 
failures at the federal level.  However, the most important aspect that often is overlooked 
or under-utilized is the efforts and resources at the state and local level.   
Information sharing was considered a critical element of failure throughout the 
government at all law enforcement levels.  Through the creation of SLFCs, state and local 
governments were able to become more involved in the information sharing environment 
to ensure improved security of each area.  Utilizing and incorporating each respective 
jurisdictions law enforcement resources as force multipliers, who are able to reach out to 
the community where they are known and trusted provides an avenue for local citizens to 
also become force multipliers in this collaboration environment.  In those areas where 
SLFCs have taken an all-hazards approach, not only are they utilized to collect, share 
information and respond to extremist threats and attacks, but are also able to leverage 
resources and assets toward other catastrophic events that can be either manmade or 
natural.  Coordination and timely reaction are essential to minimizing these events 
impact.   
The local citizens, when asked to be involved and appropriately educated to know 
what to look for, become the eyes and ears when law enforcement is not available.  They 
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will know when something does not seem right and can notify the respective authorities 
who in turn investigate and provide this information up to appropriate federal agencies 
for analysis to “connect the dots.” 
This bottom-up approach amplifies the notion of using a network to fight a 
network.  As any attack in the United States will most likely involve planning, plotting, 
and with extremists living in the United States, this approach will most likely be the 
mechanism that would initially tip-off local authorities to indicators that would hopefully 
deter and apprehend the extremist.   
Additionally, the threat of extremism is not only a foreign problem, as the ever 
increasing threat of homegrown attacks continues to build.  U.S. citizens or legal 
residents who have extremist views can move freely around the country without ever 
exploiting the Customs and Immigration weaknesses identified by the 9/11 Commission 
Report at the U.S. border.  The improvements in this area made post-9/11 would be 
ineffective in detecting these types of threats. 
Through the use of SLFCs and the involvement of local citizens provides for the 
best method to detect and deter extremist aggression in the United States.  Through 
education and awareness at all local jurisdictions with citizen involvement and law 
enforcement levels will hopefully prevent the next attack. 
In the next two chapters, this thesis will focus on the states of North Dakota and 
Washington, as they are both located in the northern tier and have sparse population 
densities along their shared borders with Canada.  Additionally, centering on these two 
states provides for the variations of the unique geographic challenges of securing the 
mountainous, maritime/coastal and desolate prairie.  The purpose is to solidify the 
benefits and efficiencies gained from a bottom-up approach by utilizing the largely 
untapped resource (local citizens) in providing information to their respective state’s 
Fusion Centers.   
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III. FUSION CENTER CASE STUDY: NORTH DAKOTA  
A. NORTH DAKOTA 
North Dakota is the nineteenth largest state in terms of land area,133 it shares a 
common 310-mile border with Canada, and it is one of the least populated states in the 
nation.134 It thus falls directly into the criteria identified by DHS as a state where the 
terrorist threat may be high.  With 18 border crossings, and with only three open 24 
hours,135 there are a lot of open areas for illegal crossings for illicit purposes.  
The estimated population of this state in 2009 was just over 646,000 with nearly 
69,000 square miles which results in an average population density of 9.3.136  However, 
this estimate does not take into consideration that a large majority of the population in 
this state resides within a few major cities and counties of the state, none of which are 
located close to the northern border, as illustrated in Figure 2.    
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Figure 2.   Population Density in North Dakota137 
B. HISTORICAL EVENTS 
With the focus on violent extremist activities being placed in large urban areas 
such as New York City and San Diego, CA, overlooking the upper Midwest is a fairly 
common occurrence.  Over the course of the past 30 years, there have been incidents that 
did have substantial regional impact. 
In February 1983, Gordon Kahl, a leader of “Posse Comitatus,” a right-wing 
armed vigilante group opposed to nearly any action by the federal government and 
especially paying taxes, was stopped by U.S. Marshals who tried to serve him an 
outstanding warrant near Medina, ND.138  This stop led to a shootout that resulted in the 
deaths of two federal marshals. Kahl escaped, which started one of the largest Midwest 
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law enforcement manhunts in recent history.139  He was found in Smithville, Arkansas, in 
June of 1983, where he died in a shootout and subsequent fire. 
Another instance, which affected telecommunications for much of the 
southeastern part of the state, occurred in January 1995.  Michael Damron cut 19 
underground telephone cables at five Fargo locations, resulting in the disruption of over 
20,000 customers for several days.140  His motive for attacking this critical infrastructure 
was not an extremist act, but that of burglarizing a high-end electronics store whose 
alarms were interconnected to the phone lines.141  This event, however, did highlight the 
vulnerability of this critical infrastructure. 
These examples that occurred in North Dakota demonstrates the potential 
existence of threats internal to the United States in the remote areas of the country.  
Extremist activity was noted in the Kahl situation, and Federal authorities were already 
aware of his violent capabilities prior to serving the warrant.  As stated earlier, the 9/11 
attacks, in the course of a few years, radically changed how the government perceived 
this threat and the amount of damage from terrorist attacks can cause in terms of lives lost 
and financial impact.   
The government realized a new structure was needed to facilitate the coordination 
of the various federal agencies efforts which resulted in the Department of Homeland 
Security.  In order to truly network from the bottom up, the establishment of State and 
Local Fusion Centers (SLFCs) was created to better integrate local, state, tribal and 
federal agencies.  The state of North Dakota instituted its own center in 2006 to 
synchronize the state’s efforts. 
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C. NORTH DAKOTA FUSION CENTER ORIGINS  
The state’s Fusion Center was officially established in 2006, when Governor John 
Hoeven signed the state Executive Order 2007-06.142  This order established the state’s 
central information center to guarantee that the center functions in the methods of 
collection, analyzing, and disseminating information,143 as illustrated by Figure 3.  
The center incorporates multiple state agencies covering aspects of the state 
emergency response, law enforcement and intelligence agencies with unfettered access to 
appropriate federal intelligence agencies.144 
 
 
Figure 3.   NDDES Organizational Chart145  
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As an all-hazards center146 run by the North Dakota Department of Emergency 
Services (NDDES), it provides a central location for the collection, analysis, fusion, 
development and dissemination of homeland security information to inform state and 
federal agencies of actual or potential homeland security threats to the state.147  In 
addition, this center also provides the centralized state emergency operations center 
which is responsible for the coordination of responses for any emergency or natural 
disaster.148  Physically located within National Guard facilities149 is a unique attribute to 
utilize all of the available resources of the State. 
What makes this effective, as with other SLFCs, are the capabilities that each 
agencies representative brings to the table and their ability to interact and coordinate with 
one another during emergencies or crises.150  More importantly, the ability of the 
members to have access to decision makers and influence on the decision-making process 
are critical to the success of these centers.151  The coordination of multiple local, state, 
and federal agencies is especially critical when working with the unique challenges 
presented by the geographical challenges of this state. 
D. GEOGRAPHICAL CHALLENGES 
In remote areas of the country where few people live and where law enforcement 
is not readily available, events or suspicious activity can readily go unnoticed.  This is the 
case regarding the physical geography and population in North Dakota.  As stated earlier, 
it is not possible to fully secure large, open areas such as North Dakota and sparsely 
populated rural areas from terrorist acts, extremist activity152 or responding to 
catastrophic events.  
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One of the more effective ways to counter this threat and maximize the response 
to events is the through utilization of the local residents and landowners who reside and 
work around these areas.  They can provide information to local authorities when 
something seems out of the ordinary153 and in many cases be in position to provide 
assistance in a first response capacity when an event occurs.  In turn, those respective 
local law enforcement agencies who received those suspicious activities reports funnel 
them through the state centralized collection agency (Fusion Center) for further analysis 
to determine credible threats, as illustrated by Figure 4.   
Utilizing local residents154 and law enforcement as force multipliers155 in 
enforcement will facilitate in shoring up the gaps for the nation’s porous borders156 and 
can provide assistance as first responders when needed.  By using this form of a bottom-
up approach toward securing these remote areas requires the support and involvement of 
residents and cooperation with law enforcement to be effective.  
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Figure 4.   Number of North Dakota Fusion Center Incidents157  
While the situations centered on the successes of the intelligence gathering, 
sharing, and information regarding terrorism requests for assistance remains mostly 
classified,158 for the most part these successes are inherently felt throughout the nation as 
an attack of the magnitude of 9/11 has not occurred since.  To demonstrate the 
interagency effectiveness of this specific Fusion Center, a recent example centered on the 
local, state and federal coordinated response to the flooding of 2009 in Fargo, ND, will be 
reviewed. 
E. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION—FARGO FLOOD 2009 
Over the last few years, this region has experienced some of the worst spring 
flooding in history as five of the top ten all-time record crests in Fargo have occurred 
since 1997, of which the highest on record was in the spring of 2009.159  In that year. the 
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level and threat was high enough that the City of Fargo and Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) decided it would be in the city’s best interest to evacuate 
all of the nursing homes, clinics and two of the area’s three major hospitals, along with 
residents in the affected area in case the water breached the man-made dikes.160  Within 
24 hours, the evacuation was in full force with support from medical airlift,161 ambulance 
services from three states, along with associated medical personnel to support this 
herculean effort.162    
Although this region of the nation is subject to flooding, the experiences from the 
1997 flood in Grand Forks, ND and from the results of Katrina weighed heavily in the 
authorities’ decision.163  In Grand Forks, 70 miles to the north of Fargo and sharing the 
banks of the Red River, 60,000 people had to be evacuated after the temporary dikes 
broke free and devastated the town.164  The issues of Katrina in 2005 and the inability to 
evacuate the residents prior to the event occurring and the aftermath in the areas affected 
by this storm still resonate deeply throughout much of the country and the federal 
government today.  
There is little question whether the citizens of the Red River Valley would have 
fared as well if they did not have assistance from concerned local citizens, State (National 
Guard),165 regional, and federal assistance (FEMA’s National Logistics Staging Area in 
North Dakota166 and U.S. Northern Command’s167 (USNORTHCOM) personnel and 
equipment) support.  This assistance provided the manpower to build the man-made 
dikes, provided much of the logistical support for those that helped and lived there (food, 
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water), and in many cases the additional capability for moving patients to other 
healthcare facilities in and around the region.168   
This is not to say, however, that every aspect of this effort went smoothly and at 
times local leaders had heated arguments about whether to evacuate the entire city with 
federal officials who wanted to ensure everyone’s safety.169  Ultimately city officials 
won, but worked with the local healthcare infrastructure and persuaded them to evacuate 
two of three hospitals and all nursing home facilities near the river.170   
During this period, the State Emergency Operations Center operated for 59 days, 
coordinated an effective response, successfully managed key resources and was able to 
adapt and modify plans to this quickly changing event.171  Additionally, on-the-ground 
FEMA representatives, in close coordination local leaders of the flood ravaged area, 
ensured the focus of the governments resources were applied in an efficient manner.  
DHS’ immediate and coordinated response to this record flooding provided much needed 
aid and rescued over 100 citizens172 (Figure 5). 
After the natural disaster, the recovery efforts also demonstrated the effectiveness 
of interagency coordination.  The established FEMA Joint Field Office, set up to process 
claims, in coordination with NDDES, processed nearly 90 percent of over 5,000 claims 
for the 2009 flood.  In comparison, the 1997 disaster, from which approximately 4,000 
claims were submitted, took FEMA two years to process.173   
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Figure 5.   March 27, 2009: Thomas Muir briefs Secretary Napolitano about the flooding 
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IV. FUSION CENTER CASE STUDY: WASHINGTON STATE  
A. WASHINGTON 
By comparison, Washington State is the 18th largest in the United States,175 while 
sharing a common 427-mile land and maritime border with Canada, and the state also 
contains the Cascade Mountain Range and Olympic Mountains.176  This state has 13 
border crossings, with six open 24 hours (all on the northwestern part of the state) while 
the remaining crossings are open limited hours.177  As with North Dakota, there are 
many, relatively open areas that make it easy for illegal crossings. 
The estimated population for the State of Washington is over 6,660,000, with over 
66,500 square miles resulting in a population density of 88.6.178  As with the state of 
North Dakota, the population density does not take into consideration a majority of the 
resident’s live in and around the state’s major metropolitan areas, as illustrated by Figure 
6.    
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Figure 6.   State of Washington Population Densities179  
B. HISTORICAL EVENTS 
In recent history, there have been several violent extremist occurrences that have 
transpired in the state of Washington.  During the period from January 1990 to December 
1997, of the 25 terrorist incidents reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
four had occurred in this state.180 
In 1993, members of the American Front Skinheads, a right-wing extremist 
group,181 detonated pipe bombs in Tacoma, WA, on July 20 and 22.182  Additionally, in 
1996, the Phineas Priesthood, a loosely organized group of right-wing extremists,183 also 
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exploded a pipe bomb at the Valley Branch office of the Spokane Spokesman-Review on 
April 1, and then subsequently robbed a branch of the U.S. Bank in Spokane, WA, ten 
minutes later.184  Three months afterward, this same extremist group repeated this action 
again when they placed a pipe bomb at a Planned Parenthood office in Spokane, WA, and 
robbed the same branch of the US Bank using an AK-47, a 12-gauge shotgun, a revolver 
and a 25 pound propane tank bomb.185 
Another extremist plan was foiled in July 1996.  In this instance the FBI and 
Bellingham police prohibited a group of terrorists affiliated with the Washington State 
Militia, another organization with extremist right-wing views,186 from carrying out their 
plans.187  This group planned to bomb multiple targets, to include a radio tower, bridge 
and train tunnel while the train was still inside.188 
More recently, and unquestionably one of the more famous incidents, brought the 
spectrum of international terrorism to Washington State occurred in December 1999.189  
This incident involved Ahmed Ressam, a 33 year-old Algerian,190 better known as the 
Millennium Bomber,191 who tried to enter the U.S. via ferryboat from Victoria Island, 
British Columbia through Port Angeles, WA.192  His intent was to drive to the Los 
Angeles International Airport and place the suitcase bomb, which he had in the trunk of 
his car, at the terminal and set the timer and then leave.193  His plan was stopped when a 
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U.S. Customs agent began to ask him some questions, decided he looked suspicious by 
being extremely nervous and fidgeting, asked for other agents to come over and 
eventually searched his car.194  
As indicated with the previous state, the incidents in Washington State also 
demonstrate the potential and actuality of extremist activity threats to the United States.  
A majority of the instances for violent extremist acts originated from right-wing 
organizations which had a history of violent actions.  Arguably the reality for the case of 
transnational terrorism from Canada came to light when the ‘millennium bomber’ crossed 
via surface into the Port Angeles, WA.   
Again, realizing a new structure was needed to aid in the collection, coordination 
and dissemination of information through multiple agencies at the local, state, tribal and 
federal level the creation of a new structure was needed.  The state Fusion Center was 
established in 2002 to facilitate the efforts of multiple agencies at differing levels of 
government. 
C. FUSION CENTER ORIGINS 
In 2002, Washington State created the Washington State Fusion Center (WSFC) 
(formerly known as the Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC))195 as a result of 
the Statewide Integrated Intelligence Proposal.196  The purpose was to establish this 
agency to be the states fusion center serving as a single point of intelligence collection, 
regional intelligence groups located throughout the state providing a link to local, state, 
and federal partners with the goal to investigating crime to prevent acts of terrorism.197  
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WFSC, co-located with the Seattle FBI Field Intelligence Group,198 shares real-time 
information with multiple local, state and numerous federal agencies in the collection, 
analysis and dissemination of intelligence information.199 
As an all-hazards center,200 the State utilizes personnel from state and local 
agencies able to respond to all threats.  In 2006, the WAJAC reviewed and disseminated 
over 2,000 intelligence reports, developed 323 leads to support criminal or terrorism case 
investigations and provided assistance to homeland security counterparts on 500 separate 
occasions.201 
As in the previous chapter, the effectiveness of this center hinges upon the 
capabilities that each agency representative brings to the table, and their ability to interact 
and coordinate with one another during emergencies.202   Again, the coordination of 
multiple local, state, and federal agencies is especially critical when working with the 
unique challenges presented by the geography of this state. 
D. GEOGRAPHICAL CHALLENGES 
As previously discussed in this thesis, in remote areas of the country where few 
people live and where law enforcement is not readily available, events or suspicious 
activity can readily go unnoticed.  The state of Washington also falls into this category.  
The challenges associated with securing large, open areas that are sparsely populated, and 
in this case, mountainous regions are unique and difficult.  A significant shift from 
terrorism-centric to an all-hazards focus is essential to addressing all types of potential 
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threats.203  Again, countering any of these threats can be maximized through the use of 
the local residents and landowners who reside and work around these areas by providing 
information to local authorities when something seems not right.204  .   
In addition to the challenges associated with the rugged mountainous terrain, in 
the Washington State there are multiple issues for responding to the various volcanic, 
tsunami, wildfire, and earthquake activity, as illustrated in Figure 7.  Critical to the 
response of any incident, natural or manmade, is the ability of leaders to coordinate their 
efforts and leverage appropriate resources to counter the emergency.205  With a large 
variety of potential hazards as identified in this state, flexibility is essential. 
Additionally, the use of local residents206 and law enforcement as force 
multipliers207 will facilitate in shoring up the gaps of relatively open areas and be able to 
provide a first response to many of the potential hazards to the varying threats in this 
state.  As stated earlier, this form of a bottom-up approach toward securing and protecting 
these remote areas requires the support and involvement of residents and cooperation and 
coordination with applicable agencies and the resources they bring to the table in order to 
be effective in countering potential manmade and natural events.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
The attacks of September 11, 2001, ushered in a new era in the United States with 
the realization by most in this nation that transnational terrorism threat was very real, and 
can inflict horrific damage.  Although prior extremist violent actions had taken hundreds 
of lives previously in this nation, this “new” threat jolted the government in establishing a 
new organization to “connect the dots” and protect our homeland.   
One of the many tools developed by DHS to help secure the nation was the 
creation of a collaborative network of Fusion Centers throughout the United States.  
Chapter II reviewed the history of fusion centers, its effectiveness, identified some 
potential issues, and outlined a bottom-up approach (local citizens and local law 
enforcement) through these centers to provide the best possible means to secure not only 
the nations porous borders, but also to shore up the large less-populated regions of the 
country.  In addition to being intelligence network collection, many of these centers have 
implemented an all-hazards approach that enables a focused and concentrated application 
to sourcing local, state and federal resources to respond to incidents or events – either 
natural or manmade. 
In protecting our nation’s borders, most of the focus has been toward the 1,900-
mile southern border due to previous illegal immigration, drug proliferation and more 
recently the violence from the Mexican drug lords spilling over to the United States.  
However, the 4,000-mile northern border, which is less violent than the southern, reports 
have surfaced that indicate the terrorist threat is higher due to the large expanse of area 
with limited law enforcement coverage.  In this thesis, the states of North Dakota and 
Washington were selected due to their sparse population densities along their shared 
border with Canada and additionally these two states provide the variations of unique 
physical and geographical diversities and challenges associated with the remaining 
northern border states. 
The states of North Dakota (Chapter III) and Washington (Chapter IV) were 
examined to determine how Fusion Centers have developed there and how these centers 
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have been incorporated to more effectively coordinate efforts and resources in response 
to threats (natural or manmade).  Both of these states have implemented an all-hazards 
approach to their Fusion Centers, which allows the leadership the ability to quickly 
coordinate and leverage resources at varying stages of an event or potential for an event.  
While many of the details regarding methods and sources are not available in an open-
source capacity, coordination with the varying levels of government has increased with 
the greater efficiencies of having personnel working in a centralized location (Fusion 
Center).   
The development of the SLFCs is still a relatively new concept and they are still 
evolving.  But when properly resourced, manned and utilized they can provide the best 
capabilities and leverage resources to counteract and respond to almost any threat, event 
or occurrence.  The cost for the federal government for the development of SLFCs has 
been relatively small, but there is still a potential in a future harsh budget environment 
that federal and state funding for these centers may be reduced.  This, however, would be 
potentially detrimental to the effectiveness and potential capabilities of these centers.   
While the states outlined in this study have, in the past, responded to a multitude 
of emergency situations throughout their respective histories, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
have brought about new thinking on how to coordinate the intelligence, respond to the 
event, and restore the areas affected back to normal as possible.  The ability of the 
nation’s northern states to shore up and secure their borders and remote, desolate areas 
are undoubtedly a challenge.  Being able to detect, deter, and respond to a catastrophic 
event is essential in maintaining the resiliency of the area affected.  With this 
understanding and as both states’ Fusion Centers have implemented an all-hazards 
approach, each one is recognizing the synergistic effect of coordinating efforts of local, 
state, tribal and federal agencies and resources.   
Reaching out to the community to share information at all levels, and especially 
receiving the involvement of the local citizens, aids in these efforts.  This is especially 
critical in the remote areas of these states, as those landowners and citizens who reside 
and work will not only be more likely to see if something doesn’t seem right, but also to 
possibly aid in the event of a tragic event.  As the DHS Secretary testified:  
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The federal government; law enforcement on the state, local, and tribal 
levels; and the American people are the lines of defense against terrorism, 
whether foreign-affiliated or homegrown. They complement each other, 
and they must work together…As a critical part of our efforts, DHS is 
reinvigorating its coordination and collaboration with our state, local, and 
tribal partners—the Nation’s first preventers and first responders. The 
work of state, local, and tribal law enforcement at the local level puts them 
in the best position to notice when something is out of place and warrants 
a closer look—which is often the first step to thwarting a domestic 
terrorism plot. 209 
 
Leveraging the efforts of local citizens will provide needed intelligence to assist 
in countering extremist plots in these remote areas and also aid in focusing authorities 
efforts when a natural disaster strikes. Using this information will allow the appropriate 
government agency to then apply and focus the necessary technological resources, if 
applicable, to the affected area, event, or person.   The SLFCs provide a beneficial 
conduit to receive, process, analyze and act on this information. 
Although most of the situations regarding the detection and deterrence of 
terroristic threats remain classified for security reasons—due to the protection of sources 
and methods—nevertheless these centers have demonstrated their importance.  While 
fusion centers are still in their infancy, they have shown their capabilities to counteract 
hazards, both natural and manmade, and to synchronize efforts at all levels.  More 
importantly the involvement of local citizens in regions where local state and county 
agencies are spread thin can provide the “eyes and ears” and at times be the first 
responders in the event of a catastrophe.    
                                                 
209 Testimony of Secretary Napolitano before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, “Eight Years after 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,” 
September 30, 2009. 
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